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A B S T R A C T
This article is focused on the economic impact assessment of Internet of Things (IoT) and its associated
cyber risks vectors and vertices – a reinterpretation of IoT verticals. We adapt to IoT both the Cyber Value
at Risk model, a well-established model for measuring the maximum possible loss over a given time
period, and the MicroMort model, a widely used model for predicting uncertainty through units of
mortality risk. The resulting new IoT MicroMort for calculating IoT risk is tested and validated with real
data from the BullGuard's IoT Scanner (over 310,000 scans) and the Garner report on IoT connected
devices. Two calculations are developed, the current state of IoT cyber risk and the future forecasts of IoT
cyber risk. Our work therefore advances the efforts of integrating cyber risk impact assessments and offer
a better understanding of economic impact assessment for IoT cyber risk.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The Internet of Things (IoT) is still in its infancy: all actors and
products in this space are early adopter stage. At present, we
therefore need to understand the economic impact related to IoT
and to develop reusable models where knowledge and findings can
be captured, transferred, and used to create substantial effect. This
is because the corporate adopters like financial markets and banks
are entering in areas of new and potentially disruptive technolo-
gies such as IoT, blockchain, Artificial Intelligence. Corporate
adopters can benefit from such new models as they can point out
any metaphorical landmines and pit traps whose avoidance can
positively influence the present IoT market. It is likely that
corporate adopters are rushing into IoT without clear ideas of what
the possible impact of failure could be, often in pursuit of apparent
financial advantage. Hence, this article proposes a new assessment
model for articulating possible impacts and calculating the
economic impact of IoT cyber risk.
The IoT represents the idea of networked objects communicat-
ing their data among themselves. This communication can beE-mail addresses: petar.radanliev@oerc.ox.ac.uk (P. Radanliev),
david.deroure@oerc.ox.ac.uk (D.C. De Roure), r.nicolescu@imperial.ac.uk
(R. Nicolescu), m.huth@imperial.ac.uk (M. Huth), montalvo@cisco.com
(R.M. Montalvo), scannady@cisco.com (S. Cannady), p.burnap@cs.cardiff.ac.uk
(P. Burnap).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compind.2018.08.002
0166-3615/© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articlcontrolled across other objects, systems and servers. Communica-
tion between objects, networks and humans involves conscious
and/or unconscious actions from one IoT agent or device directed
to one or several IoT agents or devices. The term ‘IoT’ was created in
1999 [1] and the first IoT principles were published shortly after in
the book ‘When Things Start to Think’ [2]. According to Gartner’s IT
Hype Cycle, the IoT market adoption should take 5–10 years, as of
2012 [3]. The increased adoption of the IoT includes interoperabili-
ty across multiple categories of cyber-physical systems [4],
integrating technologies related to smart grids, smart homes,
intelligent transportation, manufacturing and supply chain and
smart cities. Such new technologies come with new types of risk
that existing risk assessment/management methods are neither
designed to anticipate nor predict.
Safeguarding an IoT deployment, while simultaneously harness-
ing its economic value, requires systematic consideration of multiple
risk factors. Cyber-attacks are occurring more frequently and
increasingly target IoT devices (for example the Mirai botnet). With
a constant growth of both the attack surfaces and attack capabilities,
the severityof future attacks on IoT/ITsystems could be much greater
thanwhat has been observed to date. To predict the severity of future
attacks, this article adapts two established models for predicting
uncertainty - the Cyber Value at Risk [5] model and the MicroMort
[6], for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risks.
A critical question for government policy as well as for private
sector business strategies regarding IoT connected products,
platforms and services is the sufficiency of cyber security measurese under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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deployments. The answer must be partially addressed by economic
analysis, such as cost and frequency analysis of cyber-attacks [7].
Such analyses would complement and inform better the creation
and operationalization of frameworks and methodologies for
mitigating the economic impact of cyber risk of commercial use of
IoTconnected products and services [8]. This paper proposes such a
new economic model for cost and frequency analysis of IoT cyber-
attacks for IoT deployments.
Effective mitigation of the negative economic impact of IoT
cyber risk should make use of statistical techniques that measure
and quantify the level of risk in a given timeframe. The model Value
at Risk (VaR) [9], e.g., measures the maximum possible loss during
a specific time period. The Value at Risk has been advanced
recently into the Cyber Value at Risk (CyVaR) model, specifically in
order to address the specific problem of financial loss from cyber
risk [10].
The research methodology used in this article adopts the Cyber
Value at Risk (CyVaR) and the MicroMort (MM) approach and
evaluates other cyber risk assessment approaches in order to
build a new model for calculating the economic impact of IoT
cyber risk. There is limited research on the economic impact of
cyber risk. There is even less research on the economic impact
related to cyber risks within different IoT verticals. By IoT
verticals, usually we refer to IoT applied in conventional vertical
markets such as health care, manufacturing, building automation,
finance and insurance, logistics, and retail. Currently, the
economic impact of IoT related cyber risks is assessed by applying
methodologies established before the development of IoT
verticals [11], which is likely to overlook IoT-specific aspects. It
is challenging to devise a methodology that would be effective in
all IoT verticals, given their number and diverse nature, and doing
so would blur the interpretation of IoT is its usage. Also, IoT
verticals may offer consumer/domestic applications and indus-
trial IoT without a clear appreciation that the vulnerabilities, risks
and impact of failure are very different for these domains.
Therefore we cannot expect a ‘one size fits all’ approach to
evaluating the IoT cyber risks in IoT vertical markets. Rather, we
reinterpret the meaning of IoT verticals as those aspects that can
be seen in different verticals as most promising: automated,
digital, social machines, cyber-physical and coupled systems. This
specific understanding of the term IoT verticals, enables the re-
categorisation of what is commonly referred to as verticals into
‘vertices’, a concept that offers a more abstract classification of IoT
verticals (e.g. digital) based upon the underpinning pillars of
vertices (e.g. health care).
This re-categorisation is inspired by characterisation of
devices [12] and was deemed necessary as present day
infrastructure systems are far more complex than the conven-
tional verticals, creating novel risks for failures. And risk in an
IoT deployment might extend to many entities. For example, an
interruption in services delivered by a digital vertical (e.g.
automated manufacturing),  creates impact to different vertices
(e.g. smart grid or smart city) and would impact many different
businesses, agencies and individuals. A new impact model and
assessment methodology could thus anticipate economic
impact of cyber risks and benefits it its mitigation for the IoT
ecosystem.
2. Literature review
Our literature review probes the essence of impact measure-
ments and sources of probabilistic data for cyber risk impact
assessment methods. This investigation results in a taxonomic
classification of impact measurement units into an intuitive
scheme and a categorisation of IoT cyber risk vertices.2.1. Cyber risk impact assessment
The IoT security standards, such as the PAS 754 Software
Trustworthiness Standard and the forthcoming BS10754:2018,
provide definitions for trustworthiness of information technology,
cyber physical systems and present governance and management
specifications [13]. IoT security standards also mean to enable
trustworthy IoT systems [14,15] with minimal human intervention
[16]. Such autonomous IoT, requires a risk-based adaptive
assessment framework [17] for risk analysis [18,19]. Risk-based
adaptive assessment involves the following abilities: to predict
problems, to predict impact, to implement planned actions, to
maintain focus on risk mitigation, and to reduce risk exposure [18].
Since cyber risk is constantly evolving, such risk has not been
clearly quantified through historical measures [20]. A commonly
quoted figure stated is a annual global loss of $1 trillion to
cybercrime, but estimates range from: 300bn and $1tn [21],
$400bn to over $575bn [20], or $400bn to over $2tn [22]. The
differences in these figures suggest that they are rough estimates at
best, and the real economic impact of cyber risk remains unknown
[22]. Also, factors other than cybercrime may influence cyber risks:
cyber losses may occur because of system failures, interdepen-
dencies and cascading risks, as well as through simple business
continuity issues – e.g., an outage by a major cloud service
provider. The main difficulties in calculating the economic impact
of cyber risk are the lack of suitable data and the lack of a universal,
standardised framework for assessing cyber risk [23]. There is
furthermore the need to quantify accumulated risk on a shared
technology platform (such as cloud computing on a shared
platform) and the digital supply chain [24].
2.2. Cyber risk assessment in the Internet of Things domain
In this section, the literature review is organised in a taxonomic
classification of cyber risk assessment requirements. The catego-
risation follows recommendations from literature [26] by catego-
rising cyber risk assessment requirements into (1) risk
identification assessment strategy; (2) risk estimation strategy;
and (3) risk prioritisation strategy.
IoT capabilities create new types of cyber risk [26], which are
neither anticipated nor considered in existing cyber risk
assessment standards. To adapt the current cyber security
models, firstly the specific IoT cyber risk vertices are identified
in Table 1. By risk vertices, we refer to IoT vectors from particular
attack approach used, to exploit IoT vulnerabilities. Subsequently,
these specific risk vertices need to be integrated in a holistic cyber
risk impact assessment model. Because integrating IoT technolo-
gy in the communications networks of critical infrastructure
implies major ethical aspects that humans should be able to be
aware of and comprehend, while also benefiting from maximum
possible levels of trust and privacy. Integrating IoT technology in
the communications networks also triggers question on data
ownership, data privacy and economic lifespan of digital assets, it
has been established that digital assets can outlive humans [25],
triggering the question of data ownership after the end of data
owners’ lives. Some studies have simplified the topic with the
assumption of limited economic lifespans for all classes of digital
assets [24].
An integration of IoT risk vertices into reliable cyber security
frameworks would help with preventing abuse originating from
malicious interventions, including those perpetrated by organised
crime, terror organisations or state-sponsored aggressors. An
analysis of the complete economic impact of data compromises
would empower the communications network providers or data
owners with the ability to create clear, rigorous, industry-accepted
mechanisms to measure, control, analyse, distribute and manage
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cyber security for critical infrastructure.
3. Research methodology
This section outlines the methodology applied in the research
reported here. The methodology began with a literature review to
create a taxonomical categorisation of impact assessment classes.
In Section 4, a SWOT analysis of existing frameworks discusses
the complexities of designing a new impact assessment. Finally,
in Section 5 a new quantitative model is developed, by adopting
the Cyber Value-at-Risk (CyVaR) model [36] and MicroMort (MM)
[6] for impact assessment of IoT cyber risk. The CyVaR model is
based on the notion of value at risk, widely used in the financial
services industry and based on a probabilistic approach to
estimate the likely loss from cyberattacks over a given period.
This model attempts to understand the economic impact of cyber
risk for individual organisations [23] and has been promoted for
standardisation of language, models and methods [37]. Building
upon the CyVaR, a unifying economic framework proposed the use
of measurement units for cyber risk [24]. Other cyber value
analysis methods have proposed to calculate the cost of different
cyber-attack types [38], but they lack data for validating their
models. This lack of data has motivated the development of a
proof-of-concept method [23], based on data assumptions. The
weakness in the latter approach is that economic impact is
calculated on organisations’ stand-alone cyber risk, because
credible data assumptions can only be made on intra-organiza-
tional data. However, business impact for the same risk can vary
widely between companies based on the specific circumstances of
each company [39]. Furthermore, that approach ignores the
correlation effect of organisations sharing infrastructure and
information, and by default, that of sharing cyber risk exposure.
Cyber risk exists in multiple physical, information, cognitive, and
social domains – to mention software, hardware, firmware,
adjacent systems, energy supplies, supply chains – and the
economic impact is related to these closely interconnected
systems. This close interconnection of disparate systems increases
the probability of ‘cascading impacts’ [20].
To summarize, the work reported in this article therefore
applied multidisciplinary methodologies, along with established
risk measurement methods such as MicroMort (MM) to define
individual risk units and Value-at-Risk (VaR) for measuring market
cyber risk.
4. Analysis of cyber risk frameworks, methods, systems and
models
Existing risk assessment methods based on Return on Invest-
ment (ROI) and Net Present Value (NPV), include broad sets ofTable 1
Taxonomic classification of cyber risk assessment requirements.
Classification of categories
Risk identification assessment
strategy
This should cover: espionage, theft, or terrorist attacks
mitigate any risks [29].
Risk identification should be supported with forensics
with agencies responsible to identify external cyber-
Risk estimation strategy This should cover information assurance, data secur
storage facilities [20,30,31].
This also requires supply chain risk analysis of comp
enable a disruption or an unauthorised function [20
Risk prioritisation strategy This should limit the access of source code to crucia
eliminating deliberate flaws and vulnerabilities [27]
To prevent continuation of cyber-attacks, risk priorit
reporting and shared database resources should alsocriteria, e.g. ‘economics of privacy’ [40], ‘optimal amount to invest’
[41], ‘risk averseness’ [42]. However, cyber risk covers more
elements than thos pertaining to the financial cost of information
security. Thus, we need a method that can integrate cyber risks
directly with economics [24]. Because the motivation for cyber risk
can be other than purely financial (e.g. espionage) yet still create
economic impact, said impact should be calculated in terms of
averages and for the most severe scenarios [23].
To make such calculations for impact assessment reasonably
precise and meaningful, different modelling approaches need to be
integrated into a new and more reliable impact assessment model.
Such integration is important for the reasons aforementioned.
Insurance companies need to better understand such the integra-
tion of diverse approaches and how it may influence cyber risk
assessments. This understanding is often furthered through a
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analy-
sis. We now summaize the SWOT analysis of the reviewed
frameworks, methods, systems and models.
The Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability
Evaluation (OCTAVE) [43] investigates recovery impact areas via a
questionnaire. OCTAVE does not address the quantification of risk
impact; more concerningly, it does not provide examples of how
the methodology is applied. The greatest opportunities OCTAVE
presents are applicable to small companies with limited
resources, because it is free and easy to use. In terms of how it
fits with other approaches, it could be used as a starting point in
risk assessment. OCTAVE method is fairly complex to understand
and this should be considered as a threat, considering that the
main users for this method could be from small companies with
limited resources.
The Threat Assessment & Remediation Analysis (TARA) [44] is
focused on targeting only the most crucial exposures. This
represents a different approach to other predictive frameworks
focused on defending all vulnerabilities. TARA is similar to OCTAVE
in terms of not focusing on the quantification problem. The
opportunities TARA creates are mainly based on its complimentary
nature. TARA, e.g., can be applied in combination with other
approaches such as the second step after OCTAVE. The greatest
strength of TARA also represents its greatest weakness: it only
focuses on the greatest risk, other risks are ignored.
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [45] applies
simple mathematical approximations to translate experts opinions
into a numerical score of vulnerability severity. CVSS is based on a
small number of variables. Although the scoring is based on 0–10,
the actual system contains only 3 color-coded levels. This
effectively means that score simplifications result in different
vulnerabilitis having the same level or similar score. The greatest
opportunity for the CVSS is its potential to increase the number of
colours for its color-coding system and by doing that, to enhance
the visibility of different scores. The threat from CVSS is that the, which in effect requires electronic and physical security [27,28], to anticipate and
, prognostics, and recovery plans, for analysis of cyber-attacks and for coordination
attack vectors [20].
ity and protection for data in transit, from physical and electronic domains and
onents introduced in the supply chain [32], modified from its original design to
,33].
l personnel and should provide software assurance and application security for
.
isation should focus on information sharing and reporting. Fast cyber-attack
 be developed [20,34,35].
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may wrongly convey a sense of certainty and truthfulness.
The Exostar system (Exostar) [46] is focused on cybersecurity of
supply chains and regulatory compliance of supply-chain partners.
This also represents a different focus as most of the other
approaches reviewed are focused on the companies’ stand-alone
assessments. Exostar, however, does not assess a company’s stand-
alone risk. Rather, its focus is entirely on supply-chain partners.
The greatest opportunity for the Exostar system is to integrate with
other approaches and to combine companies’ own risk assessment
with the supply chain risk assessment. The main threat from
applying the Exostar system is that the results depend on the
supply-chain partners providing answers in a questionnaire. If the
answers are incomplete or incorrect, their use is likely to lead to
incorrect results.
The Capability Maturity Model Integrated (CMMI) [47] is
focused on enterprise risk and the risk in the product development
lifecycle. This approach is complimenting Exostar and, in
combination, these two approaches would seem to present a
more comprehensive model. The weakness of the CMMI is that it
only points out vulnerabilities, it does not provide guidance on
addressing identified vulnerabilities. The greatest opportunity for
the CMMI is the continuous updates with the ISO 9001. Since the
two approaches are related, there are opportunities in updating the
CMMI with the ISO 9001 criteria. The threat from applying the
CMMI is that the weaknesses would be easy to identify, but difficult
to correct.
The approach of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) in [48] is distinct from other approaches because
it represents a collection of standards and guidelines. The NIST
framework covers risk assessment and risk management, which are
two separate but complimenting operations. The weakness of the
NIST framework is that it is effectively a framework with
documented processes, which could be made usable by the
development of tools that automate such processes. The greatest
opportunity for the NIST framework is to replace the extensive use of
acronyms it offers with an automation tool. For example, since these
abbreviations seem to be created in an Excel file, the use of pivot
tables could enable companies to select one section of the criteria in
the process of reviewing the company’s compliance. The threat from
applying the NIST framework stems from its large size, extensive
scope, and lack of automation support; the latter makes the process
of documenting the updated recommendations time-consuming.
Other approaches could be updated faster, making made recom-
mendations perhaps less effective due to the extra time and work
required to reflect them in documents.
The Factor Analysis of Information Risk Institute (FAIR) [49]
model is singled out by its use of a quantitative approach for
impact assessment. The main strength of the FAIR approach is that
it recommends acceptable levels of exposure. The opportunity for
the FAIR is to develop a standardisation reference that would not
be based on voluntary compliance and consensus. This would
effectively address the greatest weakness of the ISO stand-
ardisation approach. The threat from the FAIR model is that it
promotes a commercial software, which comes at a cost. This
creates problems for standardisation of the risk assessment
approach, as the standardisation could be perceived as a platform
for promoting commercial software.
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) [50]
differentiates itself with its focus on global standardisation of risk
assessment. While the ISO approach promotes compliance and
standardisation, it is effectively based on voluntary compliance
and the standardisation is based on consensus. Yet, one can hardly
imagine how a consensus can be reached in some areas of risk
assessment where different countries and partners would have
conflicting interests. The weakness is therefore that if consensuscannot be reached, some areas may not be included. Even if
consensus is reached, there is no mechanism to ensure compliance.
The greatest opportunity for the ISO approach is the potential to
expand into a global standardisation reference for cyber risk
assessment. The greatest threat to ISO is that it depends on the
voluntary compliance and consensus from 161 countries and 778
technical committees and subcommittees. The coordination and
implementation of such complex structure, based on voluntary
compliance and consensus, is difficult to advance with the same
speed as the cyber risks themselves evolve.
The RiskLens [51] is a quantitative assessment software
promoted by the FAIR model. The main criticism of this software
is that it is not peer-reviewed and effectively represents a black box
whose results you have to trust, without being able to understand
the process of how the quantification results are calculated. The
greatest opportunity for the RiskLens software is to subject its
algorithms to a peer-reviewed process. While this could conflict
with the commercial nature of the software, the assessment should
not lose value from the peer-review. There are alternatives to
protecting the commercial values of the software, other than
keeping it as a black box. The threat is that with the current lack of
peer-review validation, the validity and confidence in results could
easily be questioned.
The Cyber Value at Risk (CyVaR) [10], similarly to the RiskLens
software, represents a quantitative approach and can be based on
Monte Carlo simulations. The CyVaR model is also promoted by the
FAIR institute. The criticisms of this approach are too many to cover
here. Some of the most concerning weaknesses include the lack of
required data (e.g. standard deviation, mean and median of
recorded losses from cyber-attacks, etc.) to conduct the assess-
ment. The greatest opportunity for the CyVaR model is to integrate
new types of risks, e.g. the IoT cyber risks. The threat to applying
CyVaR is its complexity. Unless simplified in an automated
approach, enterprises could find it difficult to understand and
apply the approach.
The above SWOT analyses explain multiple issues in building
one quantitative model that would control all complexities of
cyber risk assessment. Existing cyber risk frameworks and
methodologies are constrained by a number of limitations. For
instance, cyber risk assessment frameworks are based on security
control domains and assess security posture, but are not effective
in assessing high-risk loss scenarios developed around critical
digital assets [24]. Furthermore, cyber risk assessment methodol-
ogies have created an inconsistency in measuring cyber risk,
because of the absence of a common point of reference [24]. It is
argued that the common point of reference should be represented
as a unified approach for cyber risk assessment [8,52].
There are additional complexities not discussed in the analysis,
because they are almost impossible to quantify. For example, in
information assets such as intellectual property of digital
information, the future value is lost even under early detection
[23]. Therefore, the economic value of digital assets has to reflect
their economic functions before their value can be properly
assigned [24]. In addition, analysing the economic impact of cyber
risk is also complicated because of the impact on brand reputation,
the cost of downtime, legal liability, cost of intellectual property
loss, and many other variables. Media coverage of cyber risk alone
has created such significant economic impact that managing risk
has become ‘imperative’ [21]. The following section, develops the
design of a holistic model for calculating the economic impact of
IoT cyber risks.
5. The model
We need a reliable model for costing cybercrime [53] and the
first step in developing a costing model for IoT cyber risk is to
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of cybercrime, we refer to established methods for calculating risk.
Risk = Likelihood  Consequences, and cyber-risk can be de-
fined as a function of:
R = {si, pi, xi}, i = 1, 2, . . . , N,
R – risk; s – the description of a scenario (undesirable event); p
– the probability of a scenario; x – the measure of consequences or
damage caused by a scenario; N – the number of possible scenarios
that may cause damage to a system.
The described model is classical, but the question remains how
p and x be estimated. Since we do not have the precise
measurements and concrete number of the IoT cyber risks, an
answer is difficult to present and justify with a degree of certainty
that the estimation is correct. We can, however, discuss how p and
x can be estimated if we had the required data. Looking at this
problem from the perspective of probability theory, the cyber risk
from one IoT vertical is represented as T and the cyber risk from its
associated IoT vertices is represented as Y, and the Tx is the margin.
Then the probabilities are defined as follows:
1. P(Tx|Y)=P(Tx&Y)/P(Y)P(Tx|Y)=P(Tx&Y)/P(Y)
2. P(Tx|T)=P(Tx&T)/P(T)P(Tx|T)=P(Tx&T)/P(T)
3. P(Tx)=P(Tx|Y)P(Y)+P(Tx|T)P(T)
In a simulated scenario where the T = 0.9 and the Y= 0.1
4. P(Y)+P(T) = 1
The P(Y) is the probability that the risk impact is related to the
IoT vertices, and P(T) is the probability that risk impact is related to
the IoT vertical, and P(T) is the marginal probability.
We can therefore compute these probabilities as:
P(Tx)=P(Tx|Y)(1P(T))+P(Tx|T)P(T) =P(Tx|You)+P(T)[P(Tx|T)P(Tx|
Y)]
and therefore
P(T)=[P(Tx)P(Tx|Y)]/[P(Tx|T)P(Tx|Y)]
P(T)=[0.6  0.9]/[0.1 0.9] = 0.375
Finally, let us consider the case in which the probability of Y is
sequentially dependent on the probability of T. In other words, if
the two probabilities are not independent of one another, and the
accuracy of Y somehow depends on the accuracy of T. To give this
scenario some context, let us assume that if the probability of T is
defined in a state A, then Y is 0.3, but if the state of probability for
T is B, then Y is 0.2, and if the state of probability for T is C, then Y
is 0.1.
Then this would change our formula to:
P(Tx|T,C)=P(Tx&T|C)/P(T|C)
where P(C) is the probability of T being in a different state.
To build a model for calculating the impact of IoT cyber risk, we
need to combine established risk models [24], such as MicroMort
(MM) and Value-at-Risk (VaR) for measuring market risk and
calculate new cyber risk units for IoT MicroMort (IoTMM) for these
models. We then define IoT MicroMort2 (IoTMM2) as the value of
reducing the risk by a given IoTMM.
The economic functions of IoT assets require an International
IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC), to enable calculating profits and
losses from individual IoT assets (e.g. balance sheet, cash flow, etc).
The term is chosen to be compliant with the proposed
International Digital Asset Classification (IDAC) [24].
IoT digital assets can be categorised as: (1) IoT core value assets
(IoTCA), digital assets that are directly part of goods or services that
T profits from; (1a) IoT digitised assets (IoTDA), goods and services
digitised from traditional goods and services; (1b) IoT assets borndigital, representing things and services that are intrinsically
digital; and (2) IoT operational assets (IoTOA), representing assets
that support the creation, consumption and distribution of IoT
goods and service.
A thing’s (Th) IoT composition can be described by the ratio of its
core value assets to operational assets: IoTCA:IoTOA={ci,pi}:{oj,qj}
i = 1,2, . . . ,Nc, j = 1,2, . . . .,No where
IoTCA – Th’s core value assets; IoTOA – Th’s operational assets; c
– a type of asset listed in IDAC which is of core value to Th; p – Th’s
core digital asset c; o – a type of asset listed in IDAC which is of
operational value to Th; q – Th’s operational asset o; Nc – the
number of core value assets in Th; No – the number of operational
assets in Th.
By using the same formula, the IoTDA (digitised assets) to IoTAD
(assets born digital) ratio of Th can also be calculated. The digital
value composition of Th describes its nature of innovation, e.g.
traditional goods have a high IoTOA:IoTCA ratio, while software has
a high IoTCA:IoTOA ratio and a high IoTAD:IoTDA ratio. Other
valuation parameters are: Intrinsic value of a IoT digital asset can
be determined through fundamental analysis without reference to
its market value. Market value of a IoT digital asset is the price at
which the digital valuable would trade in a competitive market.
Subjective value of a IoT digital asset is determined by the
importance the enterprise places on Th.
Following these valuation parameters, the value of IoTDA assets
is directly converted from their physical equivalents. The value of
IoTAD assets requires their own valuation analyses. IoTCA assets
can be valued with Business Impact Analysis (BIA). Therefore, the
formula of the existing economic theory of value to digital asset,
the total digital value of Th can be calculated as:
V ¼
XNc
i¼1
CVi þ
XNo
j¼1
OVj
where:
V – total digital value of Th; cv – value of core value asset c of Th;
ov – value of operational asset o of Th; Nc – the number of core
value assets in Th; No – the number of operational assets in Th.
This valuation requires Key IoT Cyber Risk Factors (KIoTCRF)
correlated with a Th’s risk profile. Established Key Cyber Risk
Factors (KCRF) risk categorisations [24] can be adapted to IoT,
where technological factors are related to the usage of technology.
Non-technological factors are related to people, process, socio-
economic and geo-political factors. Inherent factors are related to
Th’s nature of business, industry, core operations, goods and
services. Control factors represent Th’s control effectiveness
against cyber loss. Therefore, the Th’s residual cyber risk can be
calculated as:
Residual cyber risk = inherent risk  control effectiveness.
This valuation allows for MM to be applied to define cyber risk
units for both classes of D assets (IoTDA and IoTAD) and to define
IoT MicroMortD (IoTMMD) for a given class D digital assets as 1 in a
million probability of its digital death (where a Th would lose all
economical value), where the value of 1 IoTMMD is the amount of
money T is willing to pay to reduce 1 IoTMMD for its class D assets.
IoT residual risk IoTMM is not yet statistically available.
However, when it will become statistically available for various
types of IoT assets, it could be aggregated with asset values to
generate a cyber VaR curve, representing T’s residual cyber risk:
VaR ¼
Xn
i¼1 Vi
I
Di
To compute the cyber VaR curve, historical simulation and Monte
Carlo simulation can be used, where VaR is Value-at-Risk for all IoT
digital assets of Th; Th’s digital asset inventory D = {D1, D2, . . . ,
P. Radanliev et al. / Computers in Industry 102 (2018) 14–22 19Dn}; the value of each asset V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}; and Di is the
amount of residual risk Di is exposed, measured in IoTMMD. Monte
Carlo methods can generate a large number of paths using repeated
random sampling to produce a probability distribution. In this
scenario, the risk measure IoTMM2 (which is the value of reducing
the risk by a given IoTMM) can be defined as a 12-month IoTMM2
VaR representing the loss limit Th can afford from cyber incidents.
Where IoTMM2 is the cost Th is willing to pay to reduce its IoTMM2
risk by 1%. The VaR can be calculated for 12 months to represents
cyber risk exposure over one financial year, as required for budget
planning in ERM frameworks.
The proposed valuation depends on advanced data analytics
and its ability to support a trajectory of exponential growth. We
then have the advantage of storing and processing large datasets,
hence the main obstacle is not the lack of capabilities to compute
datasets, but to break down non-technological barriers and
establish a wide range of data points in the proposed categories.
It may take years or decades to validate the economic impact of IoT
cyber risk, because of the time required for data collection.
However, it is important to set the categories in order for the data
collection to be performed in a structured manner.
5.1. Justification for the model
The proposed model is based upon the Cyber Value at Risk
(CyVaR) [5,10] which represents adaptation of the traditional
Value at Risk (VaR) model [9]. VaR is a statistical technique used to
express the level of financial risk, or the financial risk of a given
investment portfolio. The flexibility of application on a unit level or
on an enterprise level, enabled the adaptation of the VaR to IoT risk
vectors and vertices. Similarly, since the CyVaR is already adapted
with probabilities for calculating the likely losses of cyber-risk over
a given period of time, the adaptation of the CyVaR for IoT cyber
risk simply represents following the trend in cyber risk assessment
approaches. Instead of continuously building new models that
would take decades to verify, the statistical techniques used in the
new model are time tested and verified. The justification for using
the MicroMort [54] was based on the lack of required data to apply
the CyVaR statistical technique. The economic value of life has
been researched even earlier [55] than the MicroMort. The
MicroMort is used for many different calculations, starting from
the risk of death on the day we are born and the risk of death from
running a marathon. The main justification for using the Micro-
Mort is that it represents a time tested method that is used by the
US and UK Departments of Transport for calculating the value of a
statistical life. Although the calculations by the US Department of
Transport and the UK Department of Transport are different, both
departments are using the MicroMort to calculate the ‘Willingness
to Pay’ to estimate the value of preventing fatality [56].
6. Applying the proposed model for IoT MicroMort calculations
To test, validate and verify the findings of the new model, (a) the
IoTMM for 2017 is calculated; and (b) the IoTMM for 2020 is
forecasted, from using the following available data. In 2017, there
were an estimated 378 million devices potentially vulnerable to
hacking out of 8.4 billion connected IoT devices (or things) [57].
These numbers emerged from the BullGuard's IoT Scanner, where
310,000 users scanned their networks for vulnerabilities and 4.5
percent (nearly 14,000 devices), were reported as ‘could be easily
hacked’, and from the Garner report that 8.4 billion connected
things would be in use worldwide in 2017 [58]. To forecast the
IoTMM for 2020, we use the forecasted data in the same report that
predicts that the number of IoT connected devices will reach 20.4
billion by 2020, with more than 900 million potentially vulnerable
devices by that date.Therefore,
(a) the IoTMM for 2017 is calculated as 0.045 and
(b) the IoTMM for 2020 is calculated as 0.044
The next step is to calculate the enterprises’ ‘willingness to pay’
to reduce 1 IoTMM for a specific category of devices. This is
representative of the cost sum for an enterprise to accept a one-in-
a-million IoTMM, or the cost sum that enterprise might be willing
to pay to avoid a one-in-a-million chance of IoTMM. For the
purposes of testing this model, we could apply a nominal Value of a
Statistical Life (VSL) or the Value for Preventing a Fatality (VPF) [56]
to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of expenditure on cyber security.
IoT security spending is estimated to increase to $840.5 million in
2020 [59]. This can be used to define the IoT market value of 1
IoTMM in 2020 as $840.5 million divided by 20.4 billion or the
number of IoT connected devices in 2020 [58]. However, it is
important to understand what the value of 1 IoTMM represents in
this scenario. We can explain this with an example, e.g. each T in a
sample of 100,000 T’s, represents the enterprise willingness to pay
for a reduction in their individual IoT risk of 1 in 100,000, or 0.001%,
over the next year. This reduction in risk would mean that we
expect one fewer IoTMM among the sample of 100,000 Th’s over
the next year on average. Supposing that the answer was $0.00412,
then the total dollar amount that the group would be willing to pay
to save one statistical life in a year would be $0.00412 per
T  100,000 T’s, or $4120. This is a very generic estimate that
cannot be used by governments as guidance point for creating
standards and legislation. Instead, the example describes the
process of applying the formula, with a specific data sets for
specific IoT devices. Governments and organisations would need to
collect such data and be confident in the validity of the data before
they can use the calculations for guidance points. In other words,
the objective of this example is not to present a specific numbers
for policy guidance, but to present a new formula that is multiple to
different calculations, that can be applied for estimates when
designing new policies, standards and legislations.
Calculating the IoTMM for 8.4 billion connected things would
result in a number far greater than the estimated IoT security
spending of $840.5 million in 2020. Unfortunately, we have no data
on how the experts estimated the IoT security spending and the
utility functions in such estimates are often not linear. Therefore,
the economic value of 1 IoTMM does not represent a precise
calculation of the value and risk. It represents more of a guidance
point to show that, as more IoT devices become connected, their
cyber security is not competitively priced, which increases the risk,
and we need to be aware that we have no precise calculation of the
IoT cyber risk or ICT cyber risk in general.
Enterprises can obtain a more precise valuation to their Th’s by
assessing the previously described valuation formula where Th’s
digital asset inventory D equals {D1, D2, . . . , Dn}; combined with
the value of each asset V = {V1, V2, . . . , Vn}; and fDi represents the
amount of residual risk Di is exposed to, measured in IoTMMD is.
Resulting with the calculation of the value of 1 IoTMMD in 2020 as
the amount of money Th is willing to pay to reduce 1 IoTMMD for
its class D assets, valued with:
V ¼
XNc
i¼1
CVi þ
XNo
j¼1
OVj
7. Analysis of results
The calculations and examples applied in the previous section
represent real data that was applied to verify that the MM can be
applied to assess the economic impact of IoT cyber risk, as
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Asset Classification (IIoTAC) and no established Key IoT Cyber Risk
Factors (KIoTCRF), the calculations of the new model serve just to
verify the new model. After the establishment of IIoTAC and
KIoTCRF, the new model could be applied to calculate more precise
‘willingness to pay’ that Th is willing to pay to reduce 1 IoTMMD.
We need to mention that the local linearity of the utility curve
means that the MicroMort is useful for small incremental risks and
rewards, not necessarily for large risks. Therefore, the IoTMM is not
an ideal measure to calculate the IoT risk. Instead, IoTMM is better
placed to measure for a given Th willingness to pay to reduce 1
IoTMMD for its class D assets.
Finally, we need to discuss the lack of IoT data. For example, the
latest forecast from Gartner Inc. predicted that worldwide
information security spending would reach $86.4 billion in 2017
and $93 billion in 2018. That forecast does not cover the IoT, ICS
(Industrial Control Systems) and IIoT (Industrial Internet of Things)
security [60]. Given the lack of data on IoT cyber risk, cyber loss or
profits from different IoT vectors, it is extremely difficult to
conduct IoT cyber risk analysis and argue on the soundness of the
analysis. Since cyber insurance is in its infancy, insurance
companies have not mastered the valuation of cyber risk in
general. For example, Target was insured for $100 million of cyber
risk in 2017, and suffered over $450 million of loss, with an
estimated total of $1 billion by the end of 2017 [61]. This example
clearly states that cyber insurance needs a lot more data to
calculate, correlate and transfer risk with an acceptable degree of
certainty. While general cyber risk cannot be calculated, the
emergence of IoT has created new IoT risk verticals that are not at
all defined in the cyber insurance policies.
7.1. Case study examples of IoT MicroMort calculations
The following calculations are conducted with secondary data
from the The Hunt for IoT: The Rise of Thingbots [62] and the
Gartner report [58] among other online reports.
1 The Persirai Thingbot is a Mirai code variant that scans for
growth techniques and has affected at least 1250 IP camera
models. The number of Persirai-infected hosts (IP-based
cameras) in 2017 was 600,000. Therefore, the IoT MicroMort
for IP-based cameras being infected by the Persirai Thingbot is
0.0714.
2 The Mirai Thingbot is a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack, composed of DVRs, routers, CCTV cameras. The Mirai
source code was made public and is and adapted in other
malware projects [62]. At present, there are Vigilante Thingbots
like Halime or BrickerBot, that have been launched post-Mirai to
destroy IoT devices before they can be infected and weaponised.
The Vigilante Thingbots are grey hat efforts. In January 2017, the
Vigilante Thingbots destroyed 18 million IoT devices. Therefore,
the IoT MicroMort for IoT device being destroyed by a Vigilante
Thingbot in January 2017 was 0.0021.
These examples are only for illustrative purposes and aim to
describe the simplicity of calculating the IoT MicroMort with real
case study data. One obvious weakness is present in these
calculations. That is, the number of affected IoT devices is specific
to the specification of the Mirai code for the Persirai Thingbot and
the Vigilante Thingbots. The number of IoT devices that can be
affected is limited to IP-based cameras for Persirai and DVRs,
routers, and CCTV cameras for Mirai. The MicroMort values were
calculated with the total number of IoT devices from the Garner
report [58]. This is an obvious flaw of the calculation, but not of the
model. Malware authors face the same problem as they have to
write a custom package for a specific device. Frameworks areappearing in the malware market designed to enable broad ability
to infect many different kinds of OS. They operate in the method
where the operator plugs in a malware weapons package (goal is to
destroy, or to subvert into a botnet or to compromise for some
other purpose) and the framework provides a much expanded
target population. These framework solution also helps the
micromort problem, because with these frameworks, now we
can run an MM calculation on the framework. However, these
calculations are only for illustrative purposes and, as the statistics
on IoT attacks and total number of devices becomes available, these
calculations would become more meaningful and allow having
more confidence in their conclusions.
8. Discussion
The objective of this study was to adapt the Cyber Value at Risk
model and the MicroMort, established models for predicting
uncertainty, for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risks.
This resulted in a new model for calculating IoT risk called IoT
MicroMort based on the Value at Risk model, which represents a
tried and tested model for measuring the maximum possible loss
over a given time period.
Our research study distinguished between IoT risk vectors and
vertices (a concept that this article also proposed) and provided
detailed explanation on the differences between the terminology.
This re-categorisation of terminology is necessary as the concept of
IoT is expanding at a fast rate and it is concerning that at this stage
of the IoT evolution, we still do not have clear IoT terminology [63].
Our literature review expanded upon these new categories and
proposed a taxonomic classification of the risk assessment
requirements.
A Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)
analysis was conducted for cyber risk frameworks, methods,
systems and models aimed at setting up the scene for a unified,
global standardisation of impact assessment approach for IoT cyber
risk. This analysis presented the initial aim of all frameworks for a
common unified reference point and integrated risk assessment
approach.
In the spirt of a unified approach, we started with a discussion
of established models for costing cyber-crime. Then, a new
perspective based on probability theory was presented to calculate
the impact of IoT risk from vectors and vertices, using a
categorisation specific to the current IoT landscape. Some
examples include the argument that the probability of Y is
sequentially dependent on the probability of T, where if the two
probabilities are not independent of one another, the accuracy of Y
somehow depends on the accuracy of T. These contributions
enabled our study to adopt the Value at Risk for measuring market
risk and the MicroMort to develop units of value for reducing the
IoT risk.
The units we used are compliant with the International Digital
Asset Classification (IDAC) and we proposed the development of an
International IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC). To enable this, our
study proposed categorisation of IoT digital assets.
The resulting model was then tested and validated with real
data from the BullGuard's IoT Scanner (over 310,000 scans) and the
Garner report on IoT connected devices. Two calculations have
been pursued, one for the current situation and one for the future
forecasts of IoT installed devices and emerging vulnerabilities.
This model, to our knowledge, represents the first attempt to
quantify the economic impact of IoT cyber risk. While the model is
not all encompassing we believe the model could work well in
combination with other IoT risk quantification developed in the
future. There is no doubt that one quantification model cannot
resolve all the uncertainty that is surrounding the IoT risk
assessment and quantification. If we compare such analysis with
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quantitative analysts use multiple models and formulas to conduct
risk quantification. A quantitative analyst would not use only the
NPV or ROI to create a financial report. Such quantitative reports
apply various models and formulas (e.g. Discounted Cash Flow,
Time Value of Money) to create further report. It is indeed difficult
to imagine that the economic aspects of cyber security can be
assessed without referring to the cost of precise technical solutions
(ROI for instance). However, the IoT MicroMort model proposed
could serve as one model, from a range of new models, that could
be used to calculate the IoT cyber risk in the future.
It is also worth mentioning that the proposed model has
inherited some of the natural weaknesses of the MicroMort and
Cyber Value at Risk models. It has taken decades to confirm the
validity and the value of the MicroMort model. Today, the
MicroMort is used to calculate many different types of risk
occurrence. We are glad that we could add the IoT risk to the vast
types of risk calculations conducted by the MicroMort.
9. Conclusion
The findings from this research lead to the conclusion that
despite the many challenges in understanding the types and nature
of cyber risk and their dependencies/interactions in the IoT space,
there are acceptable ways to assess the economic impact of IoT and
its risks. The article informs on how one may assess economic
impact by making use of mathematical formalisms. The mathe-
matical formalisms in the article are focused on IoT risk assessment
CyVaR approach that aims to evaluate the future, rather than
explain the past by means of historical analysis.
The multiple complexities explained in the study in terms of
calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risk lead to the
conclusion that impact can only be assessed with (1) new risk
metrics, and (2) a new valuation method specific for the new risk
metrics, combined with (3) new regulatory framework and
standardisation IoT databases, with (4) new risk vectors as defined
in the form of International IoT Asset Classification (IIoTAC) and
Key IoT Cyber Risk Factors (KIoTCRF).
This article presents new risk metrics, by adapting established
methods for calculating risks and uncertainties, and identifies
specific challenges for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber
risk (because of the vast number of different IoT vectors and
vertices). The article further proposes a taxonomic classification of
cyber risk assessment requirements (identification, estimation and
prioritisation) and combines common basic terminology, common
approaches and incorporates existing standards into a new model
for calculating the economic impact of IoT cyber risk. The new risk
metrics enable measuring the IoT risk, while the risk model enables
the establishment of an acceptable IoT risk level. The adapted
CyVaR determines the maximum loss sensitivity and enables
adjusting the acceptable IoT risk level, by calculating the risk
metrics from new operating conditions.
The new IoT MicroMort model integrates established risk
assessment approaches with existing cyber risk assessment
frameworks to develop a quantification tool for calculating the
economic impact of IoT cyber risk.
9.1. Limitations
The IoT MicroMort model presented in this article represents a
quantitative description of the overall IoT MicroMort risk. The
article describes the model and how the model can be adapted to
quantify specific IoT risks in individual sectors and products. The
quantification does not represent the specific IoT risk for individual
sectors and products. Rather, individual quantification and specific
data for the model are required in order to present and reflectspecific IoT risk for individual sectors and products. Nevertheless,
the article presents the premises for a unified and integrated risk
assessment approach and the IoT MicroMort model proposed
could serve as one valid model to calculate the IoT cyber risk in the
future.
The numbers presented in the article serve to verify the new
model quantitatively. In addition, the value of the model in
assessing costs of incidents and thus the economic risk should be
considered in a similar way to the traditional application of the
MicroMort model. The IoT MicroMort follows the same logic. That
is, the IoT MicroMort calculates a probability for a certain event to
occur, rather than an absolute value that describes the even. But
this is the nature of probability itself.
In addition, the lack of IIoTAC and KIoTCRF prevent verification/
validation of the new model for an absolute certainty of any
MicroMort probability. Possibly the greatest challenge in valuing
cyber risk resides in the unknown unknowns, i.e. the potential
vulnerabilities in a Thing or ecosystem of Things that have yet to
emerge and that can be exploitable by parties that are currently
unidentified. This is a significant example of why MicroMort is as
good of a methodology as we may be able to devise when
quantifying the IoT risks.
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